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  uter space is becoming increasingly militarized.1 And, as a result of this 
increased militarization, the concept of warfare waged from, to, and through 
outer space is naturally finding greater expression in both military doctrine2 
                                                                                                                      
1. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE, AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, 2016 DEFENCE WHITE 
PAPER ¶ 2.55 (2016), http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/Docs/2016-Defence-Whi 
te-Paper.pdf (“Limiting the militarization of space will also require the international com-
munity to work together to establish and manage a rules based system – a prospect that 
does not seem likely in the immediate future.”). 
The militarization of space includes the continued deployment of military or dual use 
satellites that assist military forces in the terrestrial environment. For example, the Space 
Security Index (SSI) notes that as of 2016 the United States has 150 dedicated military satel-
lites, in addition to 31 GPS satellites, Russia has 54 dedicated military space satellites in ad-
dition to 27 GLONASS satellites, and China has 58 dedicated military satellites. SPACE SE-
CURITY INDEX 2017 (Jessica West ed. 2017) 93–94. The United States, China, and Russia 
also have developed ground-based anti-satellite (ASAT) missile capability. These States are 
also developing space-based kinetic kill vehicles, radio frequency weapons, space “mines,” 
microsatellites capable of rendezvous and proximity operations, and “dazzling” lasers that 
can be used to degrade satellite functionality. Id. at 114–16, 118–19. See also Harsh Vasani, 
How China Is Weaponizing Outer Space, THE DIPLOMAT (Jan. 19, 2017), https://thediplomat. 
com/2017/01/how-china-is-weaponizing-outer-space/ (noting that China continues to 
develop its co-orbital ASAT capability); Harry Pettit, Russia Has Developed Powerful LA-
SERS to Shoot Down Enemy Satellites as Experts Warn a Space War Could Break out ‘Within 
Years’, DAILY MAIL, Feb. 28, 2018, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-5444 
255/Russia-develops-powerful-lasers-shoot-enemy-satellites.html (noting that Russian 
forces are developing space-based lasers that can target satellites); Gareth Corfield, Amer-
ica’s Mystery X-37B Space Drone Lands after Two Years in Orbit, THE REGISTER (May 8, 2017), 
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/05/08/x37_space_drone_lands_2_years/ (noting 
that the United States is developing a space drone “designed to operate at altitudes of be-
tween 110 and 150 miles above the Earth’s surface”). 
The increasing militarization and weaponization of outer space also has been the sub-
ject of considerable academic commentary. See, e.g., Emily Taft, Outer Space: The Final Frontier 
or the Final Battlefield, 15 DUKE LAW AND TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 362 (2017), Linda Johanna 
Friman, War and Peace in Outer Space: A Review of the Legality of the Weaponization of Outer Space 
in the Light of the Prohibition on Non-Peaceful Purposes, 16 FINNISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 285 (2005); Michael C. Mineiro, The United States and the Legality of Outer Space 
Weaponization: A Proposal for Greater Transparency and a Dispute Resolution Mechanism, 33 ANNALS 
OF AIR AND SPACE LAW 441 (2008). 
2. See, e.g., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-14: Space Operations 
(2013), http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_14.pdf; Devel-












and military legal manuals.3 In fact, despite international efforts to stem such 
militarization,4 outer space is now seen by some as a viable theater of future 
warfare, no different from its land, sea, or air counterparts.5 
Given this emerging thinking regarding space warfare, it is critical to iden-
tify the way international humanitarian law (IHL) would apply to armed con-
flict in outer space. The concept of armed conflict in outer space contem-
plates both the use of force in outer space itself and the use of space assets to 
achieve military effect in the air, land, and sea environments. The 1991 Gulf 
War, for example, has been touted as the first space war, not because it was 
fought in space, but because coalition forces relied so heavily on space-based 
assets.6 Accordingly, targeting satellites and other space-based assets in space 
(from the terrestrial environment or from space itself) becomes the focus of 
specific attention. This topic raises broad questions of how IHL would regu-
late activity in the unique physical environment of outer space.7 While such 
questions are undoubtedly important from a purely IHL perspective, they 
cannot be answered without addressing the more fundamental issue of how 
IHL interacts with the international legal regime that already applies to outer 
space. This regime is principally comprised of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty 
(OST) and four other key treaties. Together, these treaties provide the foun-
dational framework for peacetime activity in outer space: the outer space legal 
regime. The interaction between the two regimes has the capacity to modify 
                                                                                                                      
tion 0-30: UK Air and Space Doctrine (2d ed. 2013), www.gov.uk/government/up-
loads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/223495/jdp_0_30_uk_air_and _space_doc-
trine.pdf. 
3. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF 
WAR MANUAL ch. XIV, at 917–45 (rev. ed. Dec. 2016), https://www.defense.gov/Por-
tals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD%20Law%20of%20War%20Manual%20-%20June%2020 
15%20Updated%20Dec%202016.pdf?ver=2016-12-13-172036-190 [hereinafter LAW OF 
WAR MANUAL]. 
4. See generally Paul Meyer, Dark Forces Awaken: The Prospects for Cooperative Space Security, 
23 THE NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 495 (2017). 
5. See, e.g., Marcia S. Smith, Top Air Force Officials: Space Now is a Warfighting Domain, 
SPACEPOLICYONLINE.COM (May 17, 2017), https://spacepolicyonline.com/news/top-air-
force-officials-space-now-is-a-warfighting-domain/ (“In their joint written testimony, the 
Air Force officials said: ‘Clearly, freedom to operate in space is not guaranteed. In fact, space 
is now a warfighting domain, similar to the more familiar air, land, and maritime domains 
our men and women are fighting in today.’”). 
6. See generally Larry Greenemeier, GPS and the World’s First “Space War”, SCIENTIFIC 
AMERICAN, Feb. 8, 2016, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/gps-and-the-world-
s-first-space-war/. 
7. See generally Dale Stephens & Cassandra Steer, Conflicts in Space: International Humani-












the way IHL rules apply, even selectively excluding some rules altogether. 
Conversely, the application of IHL may displace accepted understandings of 
space law. Despite the potential for unanticipated outcomes arising from a 
collision of these regimes, there has been little analysis of the implications of 
their interaction. 
Accordingly, this article will examine applicable legal theory with refer-
ence to the interaction of the law of outer space and IHL in the context of 
armed conflict occurring from, to, or through outer space. It will canvass 
questions of interpretive vertical hierarchy and horizontal priority and exam-
ine the International Law Commission’s (ILC) recent work on the effects of 
armed conflict on treaties, as well as the separate ILC review of the impact of 
subsequent State practice on treaty interpretation. 
This examination will lead to the conclusion that while the outer space 
legal regime does continue to apply in a time of armed conflict and does di-
rectly apply to regulate specific conduct occurring during armed conflict; it 
nonetheless is subject to general legal rules that prioritize the right of self-
defense, as well as IHL. The article concludes that the mechanical application 
of prevailing treaty interpretive maxims does not easily settle issues of poten-
tial legal conflict between the outer space legal regime and IHL. As such, dif-
ferent interpretive approaches need to be developed on a case-by-case basis 
to ensure effective harmonization. In circumstances where harmonization is 
not possible, a stark policy choice will be required to select which regime will 
apply and in what manner. 
 
II. THE OUTER SPACE LEGAL REGIME 
 
The outer space legal regime comprises five main treaties, headed by the 
OST,8 which is the most comprehensive treaty and closest to representing a 
quasi-constitution for space. The four further treaties deal with issues of the 
rescue and return of astronauts,9 liability,10 registration,11 and activities on the 
                                                                                                                      
8. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 
2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]. 
9. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched in 
Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119. 
10. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 
29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187. 
11. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 












moon.12 The treaties range in date from 1967 to 1979, though each treaty has 
a sequentially lower number of States parties.13 This decrease led after 1979 
to an increased reliance upon “soft law” instruments to guide the legal frame-
work applicable to space activities.14 Such a change of approach could reflect 
a growing realization by States of the military utility of outer space, as well 
as the increased access, lower costs, and capacity for civil, commercial, and 
military space activity. 
The preamble to the OST provides that the exploration and use of outer 
space shall be undertaken for “peaceful purposes.”15 This emphasis on 
peaceful purposes is repeated in Article IV, which provides that “[t]he Moon 
and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty 
exclusively for peaceful purposes.”16 Notably the term “peaceful” is not de-
fined in the Treaty. In addition to the references to peaceful purposes, Article 
I provides that “exploration and use” of outer space “shall be the province 
of all mankind.”17 Article II further provides that there shall be no national 
appropriation of space or any celestial body by claim of sovereignty18 and 
Article V provides that astronauts are “envoys of mankind.”19 Article IX re-
quires a State party to “undertake appropriate international consultations be-
fore proceeding with any such activity,” when it has reason to believe that 
carrying out this activity in outer space “would cause potentially harmful in-
terference with activities of other States parties.”20 
                                                                                                                      
12. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies, Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3. 
13. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty has 105 States parties, the 1968 Rescue Convention 
has 95, the 1972 Liability Convention has 94, the 1975 Convention on Registration of Ob-
jects Launched into Outer Space has 63, and the 1979 Moon Convention has 17. See Com-
mittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Status of International Agreements Relating to 
Activities in Outer Space as at [sic] 1 January 2017, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2017/CRP.7, 
at 12 (Mar. 23, 2017), http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/spacelaw/treatystatus/ 
AC105_C2_2017_CRP07E.pdf. 
14. See, e.g., Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for 
International Direct Television Broadcasting, G.A. Res. 37/92 (Dec. 10, 1982); Principles 
Related to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Space, G.A. Res. 41/65 (Dec. 3, 1986); Prin-
ciples Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, G.A. Res. 47/68 (Dec. 
14, 1992). 
15. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8, preamble. 
16. Id. art. IV. 
17. Id. art. I. 
18. Id. art. II. 
19. Id. art. V. 












Given the themes and legal obligations imposed by the OST, it may seem 
that the conduct of any military activity in outer space is prima facie incon-
sistent with the outer space legal regime, ostensibly because such activity by 
itself may be characterized as non-“peaceful.” However, Article IV under-
mines such a conclusion. Indeed, the Article provides only one specific pro-
hibition on military activity: “States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to 
place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any 
other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial 
bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.”21 
Plainly, this Article anticipates military activity though proscribes only spe-
cific aspects of that activity. Moreover, Article III demands, “States parties 
shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including 
the Moon and other celestial bodies in accordance with international law, 
including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining 
international peace and security and promoting international cooperation 
and understanding.”22 The combination of Articles III and IV seem to con-
template that military activity conducted in a manner consistent with the 
U.N. Charter is permitted, though subject to the specific prohibitions on the 
placement in orbit of weapons of mass destruction and the establishment of 
military bases, installations, and fortifications on the moon and other celes-
tial bodies. Despite this conclusion, the specific interplay between the re-
maining provisions of the OST and military activities, including the conduct 
of hostilities in outer space, is subject to a high level of theoretical and prac-
tical conjecture. 
 
III. APPLICATION OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY AND THE IMPACT OF 
ARMED CONFLICT 
 
The OST was developed against a background of evident optimism regard-
ing humanity’s ventures into outer space. Drafted at a time when there were 
principally only two space powers, namely the USSR and the United States, 
the treaty seemed to anticipate something of a sui generis application of legal 
normativity to this new operating environment. While there were consistent 
overtures to “peaceful” use and concepts of “envoys of mankind” and 
“province of mankind” in its provisions, the OST failed to provide any level 
of specificity or even define such concepts. Despite these invocations, it was 
                                                                                                                      
21. Id. art. IV. 












equally evident that preceding (and postdating) the conclusion of the OST, 
both the USSR and the United States engaged in military activities in space, 
with the deployment of military surveillance satellites and the conduct of 
military testing. Indeed, because of this State practice, it came to be under-
stood that “peaceful” meant “non-aggressive,”23 which was consistent with 
the U.N. Charter as required by Article III of the OST. This interpretation 
permitted the conduct of peacetime military activities that did not offend 
understandings of the operative provisions of the OST, despite the norma-
tive tension such an accommodation generated. Therefore, military use of 
space was permitted, or at least tolerated, as consistent with the prevailing 
regime of peaceful, cooperative activity in outer space. 
However, beyond this peacetime application of the OST, a deeper and 
more resonate question is how the OST would continue to apply in a time 
of armed conflict. The ILC, in its authoritative report on the issue of the 
impact of armed conflict on the continued application of treaties,24 con-
cluded that traditional rules relating to treaty interpretation as contained 
within the 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT)25 applied 
to determine whether a treaty was susceptible to termination, withdrawal or 
suspension in the event of armed conflict. To this end, in a time of either 
international or non-international armed conflict,26 reference first needed to 
                                                                                                                      
23. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 3, § 14.10.4, at 943–45; see also Fabio Tronchetti, 
The Applicability of Rules of International Humanitarian Law to Military Conflicts in Outer Space: Legal 
Certainty or Time for a Change?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 55TH (2012) COLLOQUIUM ON THE 
LAW OF OUTER SPACE 357, 362 (2012) 
States have shown growing acceptance of these military uses of outer space which are gen-
erally referred to as “passive”, in the sense that space assets are utilized as tools to support 
military operations on the ground and not as means to carry out acts of aggression in the 
space environment against other space objects. 
24. Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties, with Com-
mentaries, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/66/10, at 175–211 
(2011) (noting that the Draft Articles and Commentaries were also published in volume 2 
of the 2011 Yearbook of the International Law Commission) [hereinafter ILC Armed Con-
flict Report]. 
25. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
26. ILC Armed Conflict Report, supra note 24, art. 2(b) (“‘[A]rmed conflict’” means a 
situation in which there is resort to armed force between States or protracted resort to armed 
force between governmental authorities and organized armed groups.”). Article 2(b) “re-
flects the definition employed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia in the Tadic decision” in defining a non-international armed conflict. Id. art. 2(b), cmt. 
(4). The language “resort to armed force between States” defines an international armed 
conflict as set forth in Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. See, e.g., Con-












be made to the relevant treaty itself to ascertain whether provision had been 
made for its continued application in armed conflict.27 In the absence of such 
a reference, there was still a presumption that the treaty would continue to 
apply unless there was a reason for non-application. Some types of treaties 
create a stronger presumption that they would survive transition to a time of 
armed conflict.28 These were treaties with certain subject matter at their core, 
namely those that dealt with IHL; land and maritime boundaries; treaties of 
friendship, commerce and navigation in relation to private rights; human 
rights; environmental protection; watercourses and aquifers; international 
settlement of disputes; and diplomatic and consular relations.29 
With respect to the OST, it is evident that it does not include any specific 
provision relating to its application in a time of armed conflict. This contrasts 
with treaties such as the 1954 Hague Convention on the Protection of Cul-
tural Property in a Time of Armed Conflict, which has provisions relating to 
peacetime, wartime, and post-war application.30 Perhaps more relevantly, 
treaties like the OST, such as the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention,31 which 
establishes legal boundaries in the maritime environment, do continue to ap-
ply in a time of armed conflict, although they are subject to the rules of IHL 
as they apply in that physical and legal environment.32 
As to the other provisions of the OST, it remains unclear as to how they 
would apply in a time of armed conflict. Significantly, the ILC fully acknowl-
edged in its report that a 
 
State exercising its inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations is entitled to suspend 
                                                                                                                      
Forces in the Field art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; see also COMMEN-
TARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION I FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE 
WOUNDED AND SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 32–33 (Jean Pictet ed., 1952). 
27. ILC Armed Conflict Report, supra note 24, art. 4, cmts. (1)–(3). 
28. Id. art 7. 
29. Id., annex; see also id., annex cmts. (1)–(77). 
30. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 
arts. 3, 7, 18, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240. 
31. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
397. 
32. See, e.g., SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED 
CONFLICTS AT SEA pt. II (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995); U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS 
& U.S. COAST GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COM-












in whole or in part the operation of a treaty to which it is a Party insofar as 
that operation is incompatible with the exercise of that right.33 
 
Accordingly, those provisions of the OST that interfere with rights of self-
defense as reflected in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter would be inapplicable 
to the extent of the inconsistency. Despite this rather large exception, it is 
unlikely that specific prohibitions relating to weapons and military activities, 
such as those contained in Article IV, would be suspended because of an 
application of Article 51.34 Such a reading is consistent with any number of 
weapons treaties that operate in a time of armed conflict relating, inter alia, 
to chemical and biological weapons.35  
Importantly, the ILC in its draft articles also concluded that in a time of 
armed conflict, the lex specialis that applies is IHL, to the detriment of other 
inconsistent regimes.36 While the utility of the mechanism of lex specialis is 
increasingly questionable as an effective ordering principle under interna-
tional law, such a conclusion does envisage a level of methodological priority 
for IHL vis-à-vis the space law regime. If one accepts the findings of the 
ILC, it would seem certain that in a time of armed conflict, the OST would 
continue to apply. However, its application would be tempered by the nature 
of the armed conflict and resulting normative reconciliation with IHL and 
other applicable legal regimes. While sovereignty claims to space and celestial 
bodies would remain prohibited, and the OST would continue to bar the 
placement in orbit of weapons of mass destruction, other provisions would 
be subject to an interpretive process of harmonization. Hence, in certain 
cases, OST provisions would be accorded priority, whereas in others, IHL 
provisions would govern conduct in space, even those that were contrary to 
                                                                                                                      
33. ILC Armed Conflict Report, supra note 24, art. 14. 
34. U.N. Charter, art. 51. 
35. See, e.g., Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpil-
ing and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction art. 1(b), Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 
U.N.T.S. 45 (“Each State Party . . . undertakes never under any circumstances . . . to use 
chemical weapons”); Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction art. 
1, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, 
produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: (1) Microbial or other biological agents, 
or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have 
no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; (2) Weapons, equip-
ment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in 
armed conflict. 












the OST. Determining the manner of this reconciliation would remain a mat-
ter of interpretation. 
 
IV. INTERPRETATION OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY IN A TIME OF 
ARMED CONFLICT 
 
It is a feature of contemporary international law that multiple legal regimes 
can apply to a single legal question. Further, given the diffused nature of 
international legal practice, there is a real potential of conflicting legal norms 
arising from these regimes. The imprecise relationships between legal forms, 
between law and policy, and the disquiet expressed regarding the realization 
of particularized interpretive tropes illustrate the disaggregated nature of in-
ternational legal practice. Indeed, the reach for a unifying metanarrative that 
reconciles these disparate features within the international legal enterprise 
remains elusive. The 2006 ILC study on the fragmentation of international 
law makes clear that the international legal structure comprises numerous 
“rule-complexes”37 that come with their own “ethos.”38 The ethos of one 
specialized law is not necessarily identical to that of a neighboring speciali-
zation and the two may not be easily reconciled. Examples include interna-
tional environmental law and international trade law, coastal State and flag 
State jurisdiction over vessels, domestic criminal law and international hu-
man rights, and of course, outer space law and IHL. The difficulty in recon-
ciling specialized rules is a product not only of their nature and subject mat-
ters, but also of legal cultures, needs for specialization, and activities of par-
ticular legal caucuses that promote the objectives and goals of these separate 
areas of law. Accepting this, the practice of international law, particularly in 
the context of armed conflict in outer space, is one that is undertaken within 
a highly pluralist field of interpretation. This is a field where the realization 
of a unified and coherent structure proves largely illusory. 
In the context of the OST, it is highly relevant to examine how particular 
provisions have been applied in practice to determine their reach in a time 
of armed conflict. To this end, subsequent State practice provides an ac-
cepted and effective mechanism to understand the meaning accorded to pro-
visions of the OST, which can then be compared with potentially contrary 
                                                                                                                      
37. Rep. of the Study Group of the Int’l Law Comm’n, (Finalized by Martti Kosken-
niemi), Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion 
of International Law, ¶¶ 8, 10, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) [hereinafter ILC 
Fragmentation Report]. 












IHL obligations. If provisions of the OST have seldom been relied upon in 
practice, or have been given a narrow meaning in peacetime, it would pro-
vide a relevant reference point for undertaking the exercise of reconciliation 
with IHL in a time of armed conflict. 
State practice comprises a major component of determining the exist-
ence of customary international law. Aside from this well-known use, subse-
quent State practice is also recognized in the VCLT as a means of interpret-
ing treaty provisions. Article 31(1) states, “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”39 
Importantly, Article 31(3)(b) provides, “There shall be taken into account, 
together with the context: Any subsequent practice in the application of the 
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpre-
tation.”40 
Indeed, so significant is the role of subsequent practice that the ILC is 
currently engaged in a multiyear study of its importance to treaty interpreta-
tion.41 In the reports produced to date, the ILC has concluded that subse-
quent practice is an “authentic” means of interpretation.42 Subsequent prac-
tice has been broadly identified as including legislative action, administrative 
practice, and official acts, as well as action, reaction, acquiescence, and rele-
vant silence by other States to those acts.43 
The ILC has identified that several criteria need to be present for subse-
quent practice to be an authentic means of interpretation. Hence, States must 
be parties to the treaty and the actions taken must be “relational” to the 
treaty.44 In this context, “practice may include official statements concerning 
the treaty’s meaning, protests against non-performance, or tacit consent to 
statements or acts by other parties.”45 Conduct by itself can qualify as rele-
vant “State practice,” provided it can be established that States are manifest-
                                                                                                                      
39. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 25, art. 31(3). 
40. Id. 
41. See Georg Nolte (Special Rapporteur), First Report on Subsequent Agreements and Sub-
sequent Practice in Relation to Treaty Interpretation, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/660 (Mar. 19, 2013). 
42. Id. ¶ 8. 
43. Id. ¶¶ 110–11, 134. 
44. Id. ¶ 76. 












ing a position in relation to the interpretation of the relevant treaty in ques-
tion.46 In this regard, it is important to recall that silence can also be relevant 
practice and, provided it is identifiable, it need not be formally designated.47 
The issue relating to the role of silence and acquiescence is particularly 
relevant in the contemporary period. It has been noted that States have be-
come generally reticent to make public statements concerning legal rights 
and obligations.48 This appears to be particularly acute in IHL and national 
security contexts.49 At the same time, it has been observed that the academic 
commentary has quickly filled this void, generating trajectories of meaning 
and interpretation that provide creative, but not always accurate representa-
tions of international law,50 let alone a State’s assumed position. Accordingly, 
while necessarily a delicate process of analysis, the absence of complaint or 
reaction by a State party in the context of another State’s conduct, especially 
in circumstances where the former’s apparent rights or entitlements have 
been infringed, has meaning under Article 31(3) of the VCLT. States are the 
still the subjects and not the objects of international law and despite the pro-
fusion of academic commentary as to what the law is—or more typically 
what the law should be—it is still States that occupy the exclusive role as the 
creators of international law. 
Given this background regarding the manner in which subsequent State 
practice can inform treaty meaning, it is useful to examine how provisions 
of the OST have been applied by States. Significantly, the requirements of 
establishing a relational context are easily met in the case of space and the 
OST. The OST remains the primary governing treaty dealing with space con-
duct; hence, State activities within space are necessarily undertaken in direct 
connection with this specific regime. Thus, identifying State practice is rela-
tively straightforward and allows for greater confidence in assessing how 
terms of the OST would apply in a time of armed conflict. 
Article IX is one provision that deserves particular attention. As previ-
ously noted, the Article requires, inter alia, when a State party engages in an 
activity that “would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of 
                                                                                                                      
46. Georg Nolte (Special Rapporteur), Second Report on Subsequent Agreements and Subse-
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other State Parties . . . it shall undertake appropriate international consulta-
tions before proceeding with any such activity.”51 This requirement is capa-
ble of being carried out in a time of armed conflict, and may obligate the 
belligerents to warn civilians and neutral States of attacks or other “poten-
tially harmful interference” with their activities or assets. 
Such an obligation is not entirely unknown under IHL, which mandates 
that warnings be given in certain circumstances preceding attack;52 however, 
Article IX purports to go further and raises the specter of a broader range 
of military activities that may be encompassed within its provisions. Much 
turns on what conduct would constitute “potentially harmful interference” 
and the nature and content of the consultations required. Hence, does Arti-
cle IX set a high or low threshold, one where potential damage or other 
interference is probable as opposed to merely possible? 
Recourse to State practice reveals that Article IX has rarely been in-
voked.53 In the fifty years since the OST came into force, there have been 
only two instances where Article IX has been the subject of international 
engagement. One occasion arose after China undertook a kinetic anti-satel-
lite strike on its own FY-1C weather satellite in 2007 that caused considerable 
orbital debris.54 In that instance, several countries, including the United 
Kingdom, United States, Canada, India, South Korea, Australia, and Japan, 
asserted that Article IX obligations were activated and that consultation was 
obliged prior to the strike, although China failed to take such action.55 The 
second occasion occurred in 2008 and revolved around a U.S. declaration 
that its obligations under Article IX were not activated prior to targeting its 
own USA-193 satellite that had fallen into low orbit and represented a threat 
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54. Michael C. Mineiro, FY-1C and USA-193 ASAT Intercepts: An Assessment of Legal 
Obligations under Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, 34 JOURNAL OF SPACE LAW 321, 336 
(2008). 
55. There is an argument that Cold War practice, in which the USSR and the United 
States did not consult prior to ASAT tests, represents relevant State practice indicating that 
there is not an obligation to consult under Article IX prior to conducting such tests. How-
ever, the effects of the tests were limited and does not support a conclusion that State prac-
tice has established that there is no obligation to consult for kinetic ASAT tests or experi-












to the terrestrial environment.56 The attack resulted in the destruction of the 
satellite; with the low atmosphere causing the resulting debris largely to burn 
up in de-orbit.57 Academic analysis of Article IX puts focus on the State’s 
knowledge that the consequences of a planned action would represent an 
interference with peaceful uses of outer space.58 Clearly, creating a large 
physical debris field that threatens existing orbits and the general space ac-
tivity of other States satisfies this criterion.59 The two actions were therefore 
qualitatively different: the obligation was activated in the case of the Chinese 
attack, but not in the case of the U.S. attack.60 These two instances represent 
the only time in fifty years where international attention has focused on Ar-
ticle IX. Such paucity of State practice would seem to establish that a very 
high threshold of “potential harmful interference” is required. In turn, this 
threshold would inform the interpretation of this Article in a time of armed 
conflict.61 
In relation to the conduct of armed conflict in outer space, there is (for-
tunately) no State practice in the public domain to draw upon to inform 
meaning of other OST provisions. Despite this, positions adopted by nations 
in their military law manuals regarding the conduct of hostilities in outer 
space may represent sufficient State practice for the purposes of Article 31(3) 
of the VCLT. Hence, the updated U.S. Department of Defense Law of War 
Manual is instructive in its dealing with IHL and outer space.62 
In section 14.10.3, the Law of War Manual reaffirms the prevailing under-
standing that Article IV of the OST only prohibits the placement of weapons 
of mass destruction in full orbit, not the placement of other space-based 
weapons systems. In fact, it expressly cites anti-satellite laser weapons and 
other conventional weapons, which would include suborbital defensive 
weapons such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, as not 
being subject to the prohibition contained in Article IV. Notwithstanding 
these statements, the Law of War Manual does recognize the prohibition of 
atomic testing in the space environment as a requirement deriving from the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty.63 
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The Law of War Manual also provides deeper clarity that the term “peace-
ful purposes,” as contained within the OST, is to be equated with the term 
“non-aggressive . . . consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and 
other international law.”64 Such a statement is significant given the initial 
views held by some States65 and academics66 that all military activity was pro-
hibited in outer space. Over time, State practice, including that of the USSR, 
which had initially held contrary views, coalesced into an understanding that 
“peaceful” did not prohibit all military activity. The statement in the Law of 
War Manual provides a clear confirmation of the U.S. view—a view shared 
by others67—that “peaceful” does not mean non-military. Moreover, the Law 
of War Manual further states “this interpretation of ‘peaceful purposes’ is like 
the interpretation given to the reservation of the high seas for ‘peaceful pur-
poses’ in the LOS [Law of the Sea] Convention.”68 The ILC acknowledged 
that the use of analogy between one treaty and another, where terms are 
similarly expressed, is an acceptable instance of State practice.69 It is notable 
however that the statement in the manual is also accompanied by the words 
“non-aggressive and beneficial,”70 suggesting that not only are actions not to 
violate concepts of aggression under the jus ad bellum, but that there is a fur-
ther element of restraint implicit in the words “and beneficial.” The extent 
of this further restraint remains unarticulated in the manual. Certainly, the 
idea of sovereign claims to space are excluded under Article II of the OST, 
and perhaps this form of wording serves to merely reinforce that provision 
in the case of actions that constitute “aggression” in the space context. 
Moreover, the Law of War Manual fully acknowledges the application of 
Article IV of the OST and the prohibition of the establishment of permanent 
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military bases on the Moon. But while the Law of War Manual makes clear 
statements regarding the OST and the way military activities will be con-
ducted in accordance with many of its terms, it also expresses uncertainty as 
to other terms and their application to such activities. Hence, the manual 
expresses a level of disquiet over the way Article III may “import” general 
international law, given the terrestrial context in which such law was devel-
oped.71 At the same time, it expresses no reservation regarding the general 
application of IHL to outer space in a time of actual armed conflict,72 even 
though the context in which some of the law applicable to armed conflict 
presupposes a land, sea, or maritime environment. 
The Law of War Manual provides a level of clear expression from a major 
spacefaring country as to the way provisions of the OST will be interpreted 
and applied in the conduct of military activities. It asserts that the placement 
of weapons of mass destruction in full orbit and the establishment of military 
bases on the moon and other celestial bodies are prohibited in accordance 
with the OST. To this extent, the United States plainly anticipates the prima 
facie continued operation of at least part of the OST during an armed conflict, 
though it also acknowledges the application of IHL. It reaffirms that the law 
of aggression will apply to space military activities in a time of armed conflict 
(or otherwise) and it reserves the right of the United States to deploy weap-
ons that are not weapons of mass destruction into full orbit. 
Finally, the Law of War Manual manifests State practice for the purposes 
of Article 31(3) of the VCLT, as does the apparent acquiescence and silence 
that comes from other States as to these pronouncements. Despite the enun-
ciation of clear principles and interpretations of the OST, as contained within 
the manual, there is still a high level of ambiguity regarding the way the OST 
and IHL interact. It declares that IHL will apply, but does not examine the 
manner of intersection between this body of law and the OST. Accordingly, 
the resolution of normative tension between the two regimes then falls to 
the general principles of international law. 
 
V. VERTICAL HIERARCHY AND HORIZONTAL PRIORITY 
 
In reconciling the intersection between the OST and IHL, the concepts of 
jus cogens (vertical hierarchy) and lex specialis (horizontal priority) provide pos-
sible mechanisms for resolving potential conflict. 
                                                                                                                      













Jus cogens find expression in Article 53 of the VCLT.73 It establishes a 
hierarchy of peremptory norms that have priority over other more general 
norms of international law. Prohibitions such as unlawful use of force, slav-
ery, or the performance of an act criminal under international law (such as 
torture and war crimes) are usually cited as having such status,74 but it is 
difficult to identify other topics that come within the concept. To the extent 
that peremptory norms are contained in either the OST or IHL regarding 
armed conflict in space, such norms would take precedence in resolving legal 
conflicts. At face value, there are elements in both regimes that would apply, 
but such application hardly resolves the preexisting normative tension be-
cause they do not act in any kind of opposition. Thus, the concept of non-
aggression as interpreted under the OST (through the peaceful activity pro-
visions) does override provisions in IHL, but given that IHL’s focus is on 
jus in bello not jus ad bellum, there is no need for reconciliation of the two 
regimes. The other two jus cogens prohibitions contained in IHL—torture and 
war crimes—find no expression in the OST. Hence, while applying the jus 
cogens concept would seem to resolve any apparent conflict, it is unnecessary 
to do so because there is no direct or implied conflict between IHL and the 
OST in this context. 
Unlike vertical hierarchy mechanisms, the lex specialis maxim does offer 
greater potential to resolve normative conflict. This maxim provides that the 
“specific shall prevail over the general.”75 It enables a faithful application of 
the lawmaker’s intention to govern specific circumstances where provision 
has been made for such regulation vis-à-vis more general legal requirements. 
Despite finding no expression in the VCLT, the lex specialis maxim has 
been cited in several International Court of Justice cases to resolve apparent 
conflict.76 It has also been highlighted by the ILC as a useful mechanism for 
reconciling disparate areas of international law.77 As an interpretive mecha-
nism, it seems to offer a solution to the reconciliation of apparent conflict 
between legal regimes, as is the case with the outer space regime and IHL. 
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Despite this apparent superficial attraction and the ease with which it may 
be applied, this interpretive maxim to resolve normative conflict between 
the regimes is unlikely to produce the outcomes sought. 
In her analysis of lex specialis, Lindroos correctly makes the point that the 
maxim’s utility is best realized when applied to treaties that are from the same 
field or subfield.78 In that situation, there exists a contextual relationship be-
tween instruments where priorities may be measured through the word 
choice, emphasis, or even silence that is evident from the terms of the trea-
ties. Intention can be more reliably discerned given the shared focus. 
Such a contextual relationship does not exist, however, where treaties 
come from different fields, as is the case of the OST and those treaties com-
prising the core of IHL. Indeed, there are views that both actually represent 
the lex specialis.79 Such views are hard to reconcile and raise numerous further 
questions. For example, how do the respective ratios of obligation in each 
regime get measured in such circumstances? The answer lies not in any math-
ematical assessment of the specificities resident in the provisions themselves, 
but rather in a broader value judgment that one regime is to be preferred 
over the other.80 This in turn relies on political—or at least policy—choices, 
as to which regime or provision will have application. Thus, this decision is 
less about resolving contextual choice in a logically precise manner than of 
selecting which policy preferences and political values will prevail.81 
The application of the lex specialis maxim to resolve potential conflict be-
tween regimes in the context of IHL in outer space carries with it enormous 
significance, a significance this interpretive tool cannot possibly be expected 
to fulfill. Numerous examples of its inadequacy can be imagined. Take for 
instance, the question of the very existence of an armed conflict. Traditional 
determinations of when an armed conflict begins turn on whether there has 
been a resort to armed force between two States.82 There exist separate rules 
within the regime of State responsibility that help determine who the “State” 
is for such purposes. Long-established rules of general international law have 
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a broad understanding of attribution, which hold that a finding of attribution 
is still within the reasonable limits of what a State actually authorizes or at 
least in those instances where a State has effective control over a non-State 
group.83 In the OST, Article VI creates a broad ambit of State responsibility, 
including responsibility for actions of non–State actors who undertake space 
activities within a State.84 Under Article VI, such activities are deemed “na-
tional activities” that the State must ensure are “carried out in conformity” 
with the OST and under its “authorization and continuing supervision.”85 
On one reading of this provision, any space activity occurring within the 
territory of a State by non-State actors, irrespective of the actual control ex-
ercised by the State over the entity concerned, will trigger State responsibility. 
If such activity involves manipulation of space systems or hacking of other 
States’ satellites rising to a use of force, there is the real prospect of the host 
State being unwillingly (and unwittingly) drawn into an international armed 
conflict under existing definitions of IHL. Such an outcome would be con-
sistent with one reading of the OST provision, though one that defies all 
general international law on the issue of attribution. According lex specialis 
status to the OST in such an instance defies not only legal and practical logic, 
but also undermines its very purpose and object, which is directed towards 
advancing the peaceful use of outer space. 
Another example of an unanticipated result of according the outer space 
legal regime lex specialis status is the question of the status of military astro-
nauts in a time of armed conflict. Under the Rescue and Return Convention, 
astronauts that unwittingly land in the territory of a State are required to be 
“promptly” returned to the launching State,86 which is normally their State 
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of nationality. In circumstances where a military astronaut engaged in armed 
conflict lands in belligerent territory, this would prima facie require the return 
of that astronaut to their launching State. Such return would be contrary to 
the rights and obligations contained in the Third Geneva Convention,87 
which enables the belligerent to retain the astronaut as a prisoner of war and 
the obligations of a neutral State to intern members of a belligerent’s armed 
forces downed in their territory for the duration of the conflict. Arguing that 
the outer space legal regime is the lex specialis or even that this provision has 
that status runs counter to core principles that underpin IHL. 
Examples also run the other way. If the IHL regime, in toto, was deter-
mined to be the lex specialis, then establishing military bases on the moon 
would be permissible. Such a development is plainly inconsistent with Article 
IV of the OST, which prohibits the establishment of “military bases, instal-
lations and fortifications” on celestial bodies.88 It would also throw open the 
issue of sovereign appropriation of celestial bodies, or perhaps even space 
itself, which forms the basis for the assertion of many belligerent rights. Such 
an outcome is completely at odds with the governing regime established for 
the regulation of human activities in space. 
 
VI. RECONCILIATION OF REGIMES 
 
Despite the superficial attraction of the interpretive rules like lex specialis, it is 
evident that they cannot effectively reconcile the IHL and outer space re-
gimes. This is a product of the limitation of the interpretive tools when there 
are two parallel regimes that apply in very different ways to govern space 
activity in a time of armed conflict. While invocation of the lex specialis maxim 
would give the appearance of an objective standard of ordering, it would 
ultimately be a subjective value judgment as to which regime or which pro-
vision is the more specific one. Such judgments are liable to result in incon-
sistent and unanticipated outcomes. 
Given the decentralized nature of international law, diverging institu-
tional commitments, and goals and objectives that accompany different “rule 
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complexes,”89 the idea of a meta-rule that impartially settles such conflict in 
a definitive manner is illusory. Despite such a conclusion, the international 
legal system must retain its coherency, even in the face of contradictory vi-
sions generated by different regimes. 
At present, there exists no meta-rule that would permit a confident ap-
proach to reconciling the different regimes. Interpretive techniques con-
tained in the VCLT have their place, along with the lex specialis maxim, but 
all such techniques should be guided by a sense of mutual reinforcement 
between regimes. Where there is unavoidable conflict of opposing norms, 
then a self-aware recourse to publicly stated values will need to underpin 
interpretive choice. Such moments will expose a clash of ethos and profes-
sional commitment, but it need not be an exercise of relativism. There are 
theories of interpretation that respected scholars such as Ronald Dworkin 
have advanced that are designed to balance competing equities. These ap-
proaches may offer some solution to the interpretive questions discussed 
above. 
Dworkin’s concept of “law as integrity” is directed towards an interpre-
tive technique that relies upon reason and a sense of moral judgment.90 Ac-
cording to Dworkin, law in its very essence is an interpretive enterprise. 
Meaning is obtained not only from a textual analysis of words, but also 
through identification of a set of coherent social and political principles that 
underpin the relevant words that comprise the law.91 This approach requires 
a considerable effort by the interpreter to develop the historical and political 
reference point from which to determine the applicable legal coherence.92 
The methodology is an ongoing process of “fit” and “justification” to make 
the law cohere to political and historical facts and past practices by attrib-
uting a point, purpose, or value to those practices.93 Such an approach seems 
to offer both the necessary flexibility and coherency that resolving the two 
disparate regimes of space law and IHL require. 
In applying Dworkin’s approach, it is necessary to locate unifying themes 
between the two regimes and to place them in their historical or social con-
text. The outer space legal regime promotes the peaceful exploration of 
space with a view to benefiting all humanity. Humanitarianism is also present 
in the utilitarian calculation that underpins IHL’s balancing of the equal and 
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opposing elements of military necessity and humanity. To this extent, where 
interpretations of the two regimes can accommodate a greater outcome of 
human well-being or better protection, then such a solution should be pre-
ferred.94 I have argued elsewhere that this seemed to be at the core of the 
International Court of Justice’s assessment of the interplay of IHL and in-
ternational human rights law in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion,95 an 
assessment that gave “weighted significance” to humanitarian outcomes in 
any review of military action.96 Such reasoning has also found expression in 
subsequent cases dealing with IHL in the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia where relative values placed on humanitarianism un-
der IHL calculations were enhanced—or at least harmonized.97 Accordingly, 
provisions of the OST that promote humanitarianism should be interpreted 
in a manner to influence the humanitarian features of IHL. In practice, this 
means that where there are two possible interpretations open to the applica-
tion of IHL in a space context, the one prioritizing humanitarian outcomes 
should be preferred. To this end, the OST may also act as a catalyst for lo-
cating special protections for classes of person or property when otherwise 
under the purview of IHL. The idea of military astronauts engaged in purely 
scientific exploration, removed from any belligerent activity, is a case that 
comes to mind.98 
 
VII. THE ROLE OF MANUALS 
 
Anticipating legal ambiguity and locating gaps in the law, and then grappling 
with these issues in peacetime, ensures that the law has relevant and mean-
ingful effect in a time of armed conflict. This has led to efforts over the last 
twenty years of groups of international legal experts to prepare international 
law operational manuals applicable in a time of armed conflict in areas of law 
that are uncertain. In fact, it is not an overstatement to say that we currently 
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live in the age of the manual.99 The pace of technological development in 
weapons of war, and the failure of States to keep up in the development of 
the law regulating these new weapons, leaves room for significant gaps. The 
last major revision of IHL in a general sense occurred in 1977 with the ne-
gotiation of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions.100 Since 
that time, technologies and doctrine relating to cyber war, semi-autonomous 
weapons systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, and space warfare all have ad-
vanced. States have claimed legal positions vis-à-vis these new technologies 
and doctrines, such as those contained in the short “Air and Space Warfare” 
chapter of the Law of War Manual,101 but such statements, while making 
methodological choices in their preference for how various bodies of law 
interact, do not outline with any great clarity the process of resolution. 
To fill methodological and substantive gaps, professional communities 
comprised of practitioners, military legal officers, government officials, and 
academics (all often working in their private capacity) have taken the lead in 
drafting international operational law manuals that seek to reflect the law in 
these new or rapidly changing contexts. In doing so, they have continued the 
practice of the past one hundred years in which manuals relating to the law 
applicable in armed conflict were prepared by experts. These manuals re-
stated the law, as then understood, in a coherent and concise manner for a 
specific genre of warfare. Such manuals include the 1880 Oxford Manual102 
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and the 1913 Oxford Manual of Naval Warfare, 103 both prepared by the Insti-
tute of International Law, and the 1923 Hague Draft Rules of Aerial Warfare 
prepared by a Commission of Jurists.104 
These older manuals have found their contemporary equivalents in the 
form of the 1994 San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed 
Conflicts at Sea,105 the International Committee of the Red Cross 2005 Custom-
ary International Humanitarian Law106 and 2009 Interpretative Guidance on the No-
tion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law,107 the 
2013 Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare,108 and 
the 2017 Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations 
prepared under the auspices of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Cen-
tre of Excellence.109 
These manuals articulate what is understood to be the prevailing lex lata. 
However, their legal force is dependent entirely upon their persuasiveness. 
Indeed, these manuals act by informing government decision makers of the 
authors’ legal understanding of specific legal questions, thereby acting as a 
catalyst to the development of the law based solely on government ac-
ceptance of their veracity. To date, while not without some academic criti-
cism (usually made by those not involved in the drafting of the particular 
manual) these manuals have received considerable recognition. They have 
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found expression within national military legal manuals, as well as authorita-
tive citation by international tribunals.110 
To this end, a collaborative effort led by The University of Adelaide 
(Australia), Exeter University (United Kingdom), the University of Nebraska 
(United States), and The University of New South Wales (Australia) is devel-
oping The Woomera Manual on the International Law of Military Space Operations.111 
The Woomera Manual project is directed towards reconciling legal regimes and 
establishing a coherent narrative regarding the intersection of international 
space law, the international law relating to the use of force, and international 
humanitarian law. The manual will grapple with the collision of outer space 
and IHL regimes as outlined in this article, and will forge outcomes to the 
conundrums identified. As is the case with all previous manuals of this na-
ture, The Woomera Manual project seeks to draft a manual that will be used as 
a resource by military forces and governments in determining national posi-
tions concerning the legal interplay between regimes. It also seeks to create 
a normative feedback loop, whereby the legal norms articulated are accepted 
or rejected (which is equally useful), thus contributing to a better understand-
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dia: Article 53(1) Report ¶¶ 31–32 (Nov. 6, 2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/ic-
cdocs/otp/otp-com-article_53(1)-report-06nov2014eng.pdf; Prosecutor v. Mrkšić et al., 
Case No IT-95-13/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 457 (International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
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http://turkel-committee.gov.il/files/wordocs//8707200211english.pdf; Turkish National 
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The increasing militarization of space presents legal challenges relating to the 
way existing legal paradigms might apply to regulate such activity, but more 
fundamentally, as to how the existing outer space legal regime responds to 
such developments. In the event of armed conflict occurring from, to, or 
through space there is an inevitable convergence of applicable space and IHL 
regimes that requires reconciliation. 
Work undertaken by the ILC concerning the effects of armed conflict 
on existing treaty regimes provides valuable insight into how treaty regimes 
transition in a time of such conflict. In mapping the framework of such tran-
sition, the ILC identified priorities, not least of which was the centrality of 
rights of national and collective self-defense vis-à-vis other treaty regimes. 
The report also identified IHL as the lex specialis in such circumstances. 
Navigating the intersection of the outer space legal regime and IHL is 
fraught with uncertainty. Providing meaning to the inevitable ambiguity of 
many provisions of the OST in such a context is greatly aided, however, by 
subsequent State practice, which enables meaning to be accorded to its pro-
visions. Such a process is envisioned by the VCLT to arrive at authentic 
meaning. To this end, the multi-year ILC study on subsequent State practice 
is useful in its conclusions. In the context of military activities, including 
armed conflict in outer space, the U.S. Law of War Manual is a reliable source 
of State practice for discerning the meaning, at least for that of one major 
spacefaring nation. Further, the apparent tacit acceptance from other States 
of this manual suggests a measure of State practice, thereby providing useful 
illumination of the legal landscape vis-à-vis the two regimes. 
While the two ILC studies provide a reliable level of confidence in es-
tablishing fundamental starting points, they nonetheless leave enormous 
room for further interpretation. To this end, existing rules of international 
legal interpretation may fill the void. Application of the jus cogens and lex spe-
cialis maxims would seem to offer a meaningful way forward, but in practice, 
they offer little practical resolution. While reassuring in its clarity, the con-
cept of lex specialis in particular, is a fraught one as a meta-rule for effective 
ordering, at least in circumstances where there are two major regimes such 
as those applicable to outer space and IHL. 
What this indeterminacy leaves is a need for a provision-by-provision 
analysis of each regime against an interpretive framework that seeks to opti-
mize harmonization to the greatest extent possible. As this article has ad-












both the coherency and flexibility necessary for the harmonization to be suc-
cessful. Moreover, the concept of humanitarianism could provide a unifying 
theme that would aid such resolution. Nonetheless, to the extent that norms 
in both regimes remain irrevocably divergent, States will need to resolve 
these differences through policy preference and political choice. 
Recent efforts by scholars and government officials acting in their per-
sonal capacity to draft a manual that seeks to resolve such conundrums by 
application of existing legal principles hopefully offers a means for effective 
engagement by States to settle on the fused legal regime that would apply to 
armed conflict in outer space. Such efforts must be successful. The interna-
tional community placed enormous hope in the peaceful exploration and use 
of space in the legal instruments initially drafted in the 1960s and the unifying 
goal such activity would portend for humanity. In the current century, where 
access to space has become more mainstream and where armed conflict is a 
real possibility, it is imperative that future belligerents act within clear legal 
boundaries of restraint if there is to be any hope of realizing the noble goals 
of the 1960s. 
 
